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Organized Crime's
Involvement in the
Waste Hauling Industry

A Report from Chairman Maurice D. Hinchey
to the New York State Assembly
Environmental Conservation Committee
Based on the Committee's 1984 hearings
and subsequent staff investigation.

Paul Miller, Report Writer
Gail McFarland-Beneditc, Principal Researcher
Robert M. Salzman, Committee Counsel
July 24, 1986




Editor's notes:

  • A clickable Table of Contents has been provided for this report. Clicking on a subject in the table will call up the appropriate section of the report. Individual numbers at page bottoms are also clickable to return to the Table of Contents.
  • Original report formatting has been retained as much as possible. Page numbers shown on these web pages correspond to page numbers in the printed version.
  • The fold-out chart referred to in the Foreword has been reproduced as a GIF image file. Because a great deal of detail was included in the original, the image is quite large - about 2500 by 2000 pixels. Its filesize is a reasonable 170 kb.




"What are criminal gangs but petty kingdoms?

"A gang is a group of men under the command of a leader, bound by a compact of association, in which the plunder is divided according to an agreed convention. If this villainy wins so many recruits that it acquires territory, establishes a base, captures cities and subdues people, it then openly arrogates to itself the title of kingdom, which is conferred on it in the eyes of the world, not by the renouncement of aggression but by the attainment of impunity."

-- The City of God
Saint Augustine (c. 214 A.D.)


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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Special acknowledgement is due the following for their contributions to this report:

  • Robert Fisher (intern) for his assistance in preparing the reference section;
  • Bonnie MacLeod for her work on the project until she left in September 1985;
  • And Robert Terry Logan who, as Publications Coordinator, provided enormous help in reissuing this report in its present format.
Maurice Hinchey, Chairman
Assembly Environmental Conservation Committee
July 15, 1987


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FOREWORD


THE PROBLEM

The New York State Assembly Environmental Conservation Committee has long been concerned with the growing threat to the environment caused by the illegal disposal of hazardous and solid wastes. It has also noted that an ironic consequence of the development of environmental laws to control pollution has been the creation of a new era of opportunity for those who do not demur at criminal behavior if it guarantees easy profits. There is a substantial body of evidence that organized crime controls much of the solid waste disposal industry in New York State and elsewhere. There is also evidence that the criminal activity is not confined entirely to organized crime, but is also engaged in by other unscrupulous entrepreneurs; and that there have also been instances of multinational corporations not hesitating to jeopardize public health and safety.

Official documents are available, including the congressional hearings on Organized Crime Links to the Waste Disposal Industry, held in 1980 and 1981, which suggest the extent to which organized crime has become imbedded in the waste disposal industry.

Much earlier, of course, there were the United States Senate Committee Hearings under Senator John McClellan in 1957, which probed deeply into the extent of criminal infiltration of the garbage disposal industry. In 1981 a New York State Assembly task force held a public hearing that raised some important questions. The State Senate Select Committee on Crime, under the chairmanship of Senator Ralph Marino, has also done productive probing.

In the fall of 1984, the Assembly Environmental Conservation Committee held its own hearings on the subject, recognizing that more needed to be done, both in the way of enforcement and new legislative initiatives, if the problem is to be brought effectively under control.

As our hearings progressed we came to realize the need for a systematic summarization of the accumulated information that had been gathered over the years -- not only through official investigations (our own as well as those of others) but through the diligence of the news media. Even more important, in our minds, was the need to analyze the sprawling mass of data and disentangle the essential from the nonessential. The objective has been to produce an accurate assessment of the waste disposal industry and the extend of criminal activity within it, as well as to discuss policy alternatives needed to correct the problems.


THE SCOPE OF THIS REPORT

In the course of preparing this report a wide range of activities in the waste hauling industry were investigated by this committee over a period of nearly two years. In order to focus public attention on the problem we have narrowed the discussion to those case histories that best illustrate the kinds of problems that need correction. The focus is on New York City, Long Island and the Mid-Hudson Valley.

Each study section of this report illustrates one or more of the key aspects of the hazardous and solid waste disposal problem as it affects New York State. At the end of each section there is a staff review of the case history discussed.


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While it is hoped that the report will be of particular usefulness to those who are experts in the field, we have also tried to make it readily accessible to the general reader by providing essential definitions and background information.

Because some of those using this report will appreciate further information than contained in the text, we have tried to be generous in the use of references so that those who wish can trace the complex web of interrelationships beyond the boundaries of the situations described. Unscrambling the elements in a business conspiracy can be similar to solving a jigsaw puzzle, and one never knows when an apparently irrelevant piece of information can suddenly complete the picture for those who already have other parts of the puzzle.

In this connection the fold-out chart included with the report should be invaluable to those who are interested in tracing the interrelationships of the various companies and individuals, some of whom, at one time of another, were found guilty of violations of the Environmental Conservation Law (ECL) and other laws. The chart should, of course, be used in conjunction with the text.

Appendix A and Appendix B provide important background materials. Appendix A contains what is hoped will be a useful compendium of the environmental enforcement tools now available for combatting the problem of illegal disposal of solid and hazardous wastes. Appendix B provides a glossary of many of the terms most frequently referred to in the literature on this subject. For the convenience of the reader, subjects receiving further discussion in the appendices are marked with an asterisk (*) the first time they occur in the text.

A summary report, to be released at a later date, will expand on suggestions contained in this report and will include legislative proposals for dealing with the problem.


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TABLE OF CONTENTS

SECTION PAGE
 Acknowledgementsv
 Forewordvii
 Criminal Infiltration of the Hazardous and Solid Waste Disposal Industry in New York State 1
 La Cosa Nostra (LCN) in a Nutshell 7
 Snatches of Conversation in a Bugged Jaguar 8
 The Structure of Racketeering in the Solid and Hazardous Waste Hauling Industry 11
 Harold Kaufman: Portrait of an Informer 15
ONEThe Yonkers Story: Mob Pressure on Local Government 17
 Family Relations 29
 La Cosa Nostra: The Rules of the Game 31
TWOBorder War: The Mob Moves in from New Jersey 33
 Two Portraits from Harold Kaufman's Album of Strange Bedfellows 41
THREEAl Turi Landfill: State of What Art? 43
 James Fratianno, Former LCN Capo, Under Federal Witness Protection Program, Talks to the President's Crime Commission 49
FOURAlfed DeMarco and Thomas Milo: Family Connections 51
FIVEThe Fiorillos and the Poughkeepsie and Platekill Landfills 57
 Consent Agreements and Consent Decrees: An Opinion 69
SIXKessman's Landfill: A Law Enforcement Dilemma, Flawed Case Teaches Important Lesson 71
 Louis Mongelli and His Family Connections 76
SEVENMongelli: Penaluna and All County -- Pollution of Water Supplies 77


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SECTION PAGE
 Penaluna Landfill As Seen by the Caretaker 78
EIGHTRussell Mahler: Barely Punished in Three States 87
 The Solid Waste Cocktail 88
 Postscript: EPA Hires Felon Convicted of Hazadous Waste Violations in Three States 95
NINEThe Gaess Brothers: More Complex Operations 97
 Extracts from a Memor from Paul A. Rubin, Hydrogeologist, New York State Department of Environmental Conservation, on Groundwater Contamination Adjacent to Cortese Landfill, October 1, 1985 99
TENCorporate Giants in Carting: Good or Bad? 105
 From the Desk of... 110
ELEVENLong Island's Problems 111
 What Can Happen to a Well-Educated Gentleman Who Feels He Can Make a Good Living for Himself and His Family by Going Into Business for Himself 115
TWELVEGarbage Disposal in New York City: A Classic Case Illustrating a Mature Conspiracy 117
 Afterword 129
APPENDIX   
ASolid and Hazardous Waste Management: The Legal Framework and the Role of Enforcement 131
BAn Informal but Authoritative Glossary 149
CResults of Leachate Analysus, F.I.C.A. Landfill 155
NOTES 157


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CRIMINAL INFILTRATION OF THE HAZARDOUS
AND SOLID WASTE DISPOSAL INDUSTRY
IN NEW YORK STATE

IS THE PROBLEM A REAL ONE?

There is overwhelming evidence, accumulated over the past 30 years, that organized crime is a dominating presence in the solid waste disposal industry in New York State as well as other parts of the country. However, there is some disagreement as to the extent to which organized crime has infiltrated the hazardous waste hauling industry.

A principal purpose of this report was to investigate the extent to which organized crime controls the waste hauling industry in New York State. It carries forward the findings of the 1980 House of Representatives hearing on the involvement of organized crime in the hazardous waste disposal industry in New Jersey and demonstrates that organized crime's activities since then have not abated but actually increased, despite governments increasing concern over the threats to the health and safety of the public posed by such activities.

In the fall of 1984 this committee's hearings, held in New York City and Goshen, New York, made it clear that organized crime was seeking to increase its grip on the hazardous as well as solid waste hauling industry in New York State by extending its activities beyond its traditional strongholds in metropolitan New York, Long Island and Westchester into the Mid-Hudson region and beyond.

This report presents an overview of the situation as it exists today, reviews the effectiveness of existing legislation and evaluates the performance of those agencies entrusted with the responsibility for seeing to it that the laws are obeyed and that public health and safety are not jeopardized. It also provides a basis for developing appropriate recommendations for resolving the problem.

ORGANIZED CRIME NOT ONLY POLLUTES THE ENVIRONMENT -- IT CORRUPTS SOCIETY

No matter what industry organized crime infiltrates, it not only threatens the integrity of that industry but it inflicts economic loss on society and tends to corrupt it. Organized crime has played a role in many industries -- gambling, banking, clothing, trucking, dry cleaning, cutlery sharpening, restaurant and bar businesses, real estate, meat packing, kosher food products, and vending machines -- to mention only a few. Through its involvement in almost all of these activities there runs the common thread of intimidation, violence and even murder.

The devastating effect organized crime's involvement in the solid and hazardous waste hauling industry can have on the environment is only one part of the problem. The other part is the threat to society contained in its ruthless methods and the economic waste it causes through its restraint of trade, price-gouging and bid-rigging practices.

In dealing with organized crime's involvement in the solid and hazardous waste hauling businesses, this committee has had to consider the effectiveness of current laws


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and regulations in meeting today's increasingly stringent environmental standards. That is an important part of our responsibility. But we also have had to consider the pernicious influence organized crime figures can exert simply by being involved in the industry, even if in some instances they abide by existing environmental regulations. This report documents both aspects of the problem.

POLLUTION: A PROBLEM CREATED BY PROGRESS

Environmental pollution was not created by organized crime. The story of pollution involves many villains, but a consid- erable amount of the environmental damage that has been done to our planet is simply the result of ignorant, underregulated or careless industrial activity. Much of the environmental crime about which we are concerned today was not a crime 30 years ago; and even the most sophisticated of us sometimes wince to think of what we once considered environmentally acceptable.

The rising stream of dangerous industrial wastes brought on by the rapid develop- ment of industrial technology in the latter half of the 19th century had already reached flood proportions by the end of World War II, when the United States was producing one billion pounds of such wastes each year. But less than 40 years later that amount seemed insignificant when compared with the 125 billion pounds being added to the hazardous waste stream in 1980.

Among the over 50,000 substances listed by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) as posing a potential hazard to human health are some of the most dangerous chemicals known to man. They can produce cancers, birth defects and genetic changes in animals and humans, as well as acute poisoning and a variety of respiratory, genitourinary and skin disorders.

The threat to America's health posed by the leaching of toxic and hazardous wastes from a conservatively estimated 75,000 industrial and 15,000 municipal landfills cannot be easily dismissed. Such leachates have already contaminated public and private water supplies throughout the nation. And once an underground aquifer becomes polluted it is often virtually impossible to undo the damage. Such wastes can eventually enter the food chain, first by being absorbed by plants and animals, and finally affecting humans; or by direct contact with humans, as at Love Canal, where the chemical wastes produced as a result of World War II seeped years later into the homes of a residential community, creating a human crisis that shocked the nation.

These dangerous wastes are part of the price we are paying for the rapid development of industrial technology over the past 100 years. Fortunately, a concurrent increase in the sophistication of our scientific procedures has enabled us to detect health- threatening causal relationships that in a more innocent time went undetected. The industries and chemical companies, which have been largely responsible for the contamination, contend that it is only with the benefit of hindsight that we can criticize them for the immense problems to which they unwittingly contributed. There is some truth in this. As a society, we are not only in the process of compiling a new body of law, we are also defining whole new areas of environmental crime. Nevertheless, many of these industries had long been aware of the dangers their manufacturing operations posed, and some of them deliberately withhold information from the health authorities and related law enforcement agencies. In some cases the United States government was party to the deception.


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The development of legislation to contain the threat from environmental pollution has not been as fast as many 'would have liked, but it will be worthwhile to review the extent of the change in public attitudes over the past 20 years.

GOVERNMENT ATTEMPTS TO RESPOND

It is hard to believe today that it was not until the 1970s that hazardous wastes were officially recognized as a health or environmental problem in this country. The 1970 Report of the Council on Environmental Quality contained no mention of hazardous wastes, nor did the federal EPA, which came into being that same year, make any reference to it. Congress had passed the Solid Waste Disposal Act in 1965, but this was concerned basically with funding for planning and research. It was not until 1976 that the Toxic Substance Control Act was passed, which allowed the federal government to regulate the manufacture and distribu- tion of new chemicals that have a potential to harm the environment or public health. The agency was given the authority to prohibit the use of chemicals suspected or proved to be dangerous and to regulate the thousands of chemicals already in use, as well as prevent the introduction of new substances if they were shown to be dangerous.

About the same time that Congress passed the Toxic Substance Control Act it also developed standards for air quality. When the 1970 Clean Air Act was passed by Congress, New York State's Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC), created that same year, was given the responsibility of seeing that this State met federal standards.

It was not until 1976 that the federal government enacted the Resource Conserva- tion and Recovery Act (RCRA*), which addressed, among other things, the regulation of hazardous waste management. Its provisions allowed the EPA to authorize states to conduct hazardous waste regulatory programs equivalent to the federal program. How- ever, the important manifest system, which was part of RCRA, was not put in place until 1980.

New York State had enacted legislation that permitted DEC to issue regulations regarding refuse disposal and municipal incinerators as early as September 1973. These regulations were revised in 1978 and again in 1981, 1982 and 1985 in a manner consistent with changes made in federal regulations.

The federal Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA*), commonly known as the Superfund, was also passed in 1980 to pay for the costs of cleaning up releases of hazardous substances.

However, these federal statutes have not been rigorously enforced, particularly under the Reagan Administration.

In Appendix A there will be found summaries of the various pertinent federal and New York State initiatives.


*For further comments see appendix.


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THE RESPONSE FROM THE PRIVATE SECTOR

Historically, industry has not played a leadership role in protecting the environment. Even after more than a century of intense debate on the subject, it still is reluctant to undertake additional environmental precautions unless it views the evidence as overwhelming that such precautions are necessary. This reluctance has been expressed in many ways:

  • Failure to report known instances of pollution;
  • Protracted legal actions to delay implementation of new laws;
  • Lobbying campaigns against proposed legislation;
  • Refusal to cooperate with enforcement agencies.

Despite this reluctance, however, most large corporations generally express their resistance in lawful ways, and in some instances they have actually taken the lead in developing environmentally desirable changes in the way their industries operate. Very often it is the marginal firms, seeking to eke out a profit, that are more likely to take the risks involved in breaking the law.

Huge, multinational corporations are, however, sometimes far wealthier than some of the countries in which they operate, and their ability to break the law with impunity and corrupt the political process has been frequently noted. Even during the few short months during which this report was being prepared several glaring examples of corporate misconduct were subject to media attention. Hardly a week goes by without the financial pages of the New York Times and the Wall Street Journal carrying at least one story about another instance of corporate criminal activity. Some of these activities are commonly thought of as being exclusively the province of organized crime, but that, unfortunately, is not the case. The recent admission by chicken tycoon, Frank Perdue, that he sought the help of the organized crime boss Paul Castellano, 1 who was murdered gangland fashion in 1985, warns us of the darker aspects corporate activity sometimes can take on. On the other hand, Consolidated Edison's determination not to acquiesce in a "property rights"* contract sought by an organized crime carting company (see page 53) displays the kind of integrity that is welcome in an American corporation.

There is another class of individuals, moreover, for whom risk-taking is particularly attractive wherever a potential for great profits exists. One such entrepreneur was Russell Mahler, who was sentenced to six months in prison and five years probation and ordered to pay New York City over $500,000 in restitution, as well as a fine of $10,000. He began his career as a waste-oil scavenger, operating within the law. He ended it convicted in three states of crimes that may have endangered the health and safety of millions of people and that ravaged the environment all along the Eastern seaboard. His activities, which are described in detail in this report, were not, so far as has been discovered, linked to organized crime families. In any case, he was able to see the possibility of quick and easy profits in an area where the rules were not fully developed and also not adequately enforced.

ORGANIZED CRIME'S PRESENCE -- KNOWING HOW TO RECOGNIZE IT

The section beginning on on page 11 (The Structure of Racketeering) provides a benchmark for testing the several case histories included in this report. It is


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based on various studies that have been made on organized crime, including the recent hearings of the Presidents Commission on Organized Crime.

USING THE BENCHMARK, WHAT DO WE FIND?

Organized crime continues to dominate the waste hauling industry, not only in metropolitan New York, Long Island and Westchester, but has increased its operations in Rockland, Orange, Putnam and Dutchess counties. Those communities are now being confronted with the burden of shouldering the enormous, increasing social and economic costs exacted by racketeering. New inroads are being made into Ulster, Columbia and Greene counties.

WHAT ARE THE FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO THE SUCCESS OF ORGANIZED CRIME'S TAKEOVER OF THE WASTE HAULING INDUSTRY?

Organized crime has infiltrated a wide variety of legitimate businesses, but the waste hauling industry is particularly susceptible to the tactics that organized crime employs. Moreover, the fact that the individual carting concerns were originally small, family operations, largely of the same ethnic origins, closely knit and struggling to make a living in an occupation that was looked down on by the general public, made it easy for them to accept the "property rights" system as a means of protecting their livelihood.

When the nation began to become more sensitive to environmental issues in the 1970s and laws were enacted to curb the indiscriminate dumping of toxic and hazardous wastes, it was natural for solid waste haulers to become involved in this business also. Unfortunately, the opportunities for windfall profits by disposing of the wastes illegally created new opportunities for organized crime. It also provided them with the added advantages that go with monopoly control, not only through domination of the carting of the wastes, but also through ownership and operation of the waste disposal facilities.

WHY HAS NOT GOVERNMENT RESPONDED WITH NEW LAWS AND TOUGHER ENFORCEMENT?

Government has not been inactive. Much new legislation has been enacted at both the state and federal levels, but the new laws are not completely adequate because they were designed to fit a social context in which the lawbreaker is the exception rather than the rule. What was not recognized is that a conspiracy was already in place that, if left unchallenged, could effectively destroy the nation's efforts to solve the solid and hazardous waste disposal problem. The facts and interrelationships disclosed in the accompanying report suggest strongly that there already exists an organized crime network, if not directed by one individual or family, at least sufficiently coordinated so that the network functions as a classical conspiracy.

This conspiracy has now become so basic a functional part of the waste hauling industry that it will not be uprooted unless, first, the public is taught to recognize the pervasiveness and seriousness of the problem, and secondly, government is prepared to make the necessary commitment in terms of funding and effective laws and regulations.

Wherever there are governmental regulations there never will be sufficient resources to guarantee 100 percent compliance with those regulations. However, the right combination of programs, by changing society's basic attitudes, can deprive criminal activity of the permissive climate in which it so readily flourishes.


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That combination of programs should include:

  1. A system of inspection and controls within the industry that compels accountability of requiring adequate documentation of activities.
  2. Adequate funding and staffing of the regulating agencies to ensure reasonable monitoring capability.
  3. A system of fines and penalties sufficient to discourage "bad actors."
  4. A permitting system that provides the opportunity to eliminate from the industry those found guilty of criminal practices in connection with the industry.
  5. An educational and public relations program that creates a social climate where the public will be disinclined to tolerate violations.

These programs will be discussed in detail and placed in public policy perspective in a subsequent volume dealing with recommendations.


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LA COSA NOSTRA (LCN)
IN A NUTSHELL

"La Cosa Nostra, which in Italian means 'Our thing,' is an association of criminals joined together to carry out illegal pursuits. The term was first brought to the public's attention in 1963 when Joseph Valachi, a government informant who had been a member of the New York LCN family headed by Vito Genovese, testified before the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations.

"La Cosa Nostra families are run in an hierarchical manner. Each family is controlled by a 'boss,' who is assisted by an 'underboss,' and advised by a 'consiglieri.' The next level down is that of the 'caporegime.' Each boss has under his control a number of 'capos' or lieutenants, the number of these depending on the size of the family. Each capo controls a 'regime' consisting of inducted or 'made' members of the family. These members are referred to a 'soldate,' 'soldier,' or 'buttons.' A member of a family is sometimes referred to as a 'wise guy' or a 'made' man. Made men frequently have non-members working for or with them. 'Associate' is the term law enforcement uses to identify a person who, while not an LCN member, works closely with the family. LCN members are males of Italian ancestry. Associates may be of any race, color, creed, or national origin.

"The hierarchical structure of the LCN families has led some observers to place unwarranted stress on the organization of these groups as if they were highly formalized military commands. In fact, LCN families are not as formal as supposed. With a given family, for example, a certain capo may not enjoy as much respect or exercise as much influence as a lower ranking member. Similarly, law enforcement experts point out, the ability to generate money for the family--that quality which causes his peers to view him as an 'earner'--is considered an important measure of the status of a member. An associate who is felt to be a good earner may also enjoy considerable respect and influence." 2

--Profile of Organized Crime: Mid-Atlantic Region,
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations,
United States Senate


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SNATCHES OF CONVERSATION
IN A BUGGED JAGUAR

(From tapes quoted in The President's Crime Commission Report) 3

Salvatore Avellino, "made" LCN member, chauffeur to Anthony Corallo, boss of the Lucchese Crime family, as he detects their car is being tailed by law enforcement: They're right behind us now, they figure you running some big, big enterprises right now. That's what it is. You know, with the garbage, and with an . . . and with the incinerators now, and ah . . . with all that shit. Incineration is big thing with us, the thing of the future. They figure that you got it, you control it.

Corallo: They're right, you know.

* * * * *

Avellino to Richard DeLuca, Lucchese Crime family member: He's telling me that the union is his, you know. So I'm saying: what do you mean, the union is yours? He believes the fucking union is his, and what am I gonna--you know--I'm gonna say: the union, nothing, is yours. Everything is the boss and we only got the privilege of working it or running it, unless you got a, something that is a legitimate thing, you know, that it's yours, then they say: well, that's yours, but anything that's got to do. . . .

DeLuca: You operate at his pleasure. . . . A lot of guys forget that.

Avellino: I mean, I know Salem [Carting] is mine in stock, but I gave--I signed my life to you.

DeLuca: Yeah.


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Avellino: 50 really, if I sign my life to you, my stock is yours, but because you're kind enough that you don't make a demand on me.

* * * * *

Avellino in a conversation with Emedio Pazzini, associate of Avellino and owner of Jamaica Ash and Rubbish Removal.

Fazzini: You've got to control the men. That's the power.

Avellino: That's the power.

Fazzini: You gotta control the workers [inaudible] right now you control the employers.

Avellino: Right. Right now we as the Association, we control the bosses, right. Now, when we control the men, we control the bosses even better, now because they're even more fuckin' afraid. Right.

Fazzini: Sal, please don't let my men walk backwards. Let them walk ahead.

Avellino: Do you understand me? Now, when you got a guy that steps out of line and this and that now you got the whip. You got the fuckin' whip. This is what he tells me all the time: "A strong union makes money for everybody, including the wise guys." The wise guys even make more money with a strong union.


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THE STRUCTURE OF RACKETEERING IN THE
SOLID AND HAZARDOUS WASTE HAULING INDUSTRY

Just as a traveler understands better the country he is visiting by learning in advance something of the customs and practices of its people, so the reader of the following case studies of criminal activities in the solid and hazardous waste hauling business should benefit from a preliminary review of organized crime's modus operandi.

Fortunately, the many studies that have been made on organized crime, including the recent hearings of the Presidents Commission on Organized Crime, provide the basis for a fairly precise profile that can be used as a benchmark for testing the several case histories presented in this report.

Although this profile is based on La Cosa Nostra (LCN)--the specific group subject to scrutiny in this report--many of the characteristics are shared by other organized crime groups active in the United States, the activities of which are not as well known to the general public because they are smaller in scope and have received less media attention. There are regional gangs operating in various sections of the country where the dominant membership may be black, Jewish, German, Polish, Dutch, Lebanese, Mexican or South American, depending on the ethnic background of the particular region. There are also branches of Asian-based gangs, such the Japanese Yakuza and the Chinese Triad Societies, which have become increasingly active in this country in recent years, particularly in the area of illegal drug traffic.

Describing a Triad Society, James Harmon, Executive Director of the President's Commission on Organized Crime, suggested that it be thought of as roughly equivalent to a Mafia family. "It does have some variations in structure, but it is comparable and equivalent to what people generally think of as the Mafia family. It does have a hierarchy, it does have a way to discipline, it does have a way to share profits and allocate responsibility and territories and it does have a way to dissolve disputes among and between various Triad Societies."

* * * * *

Identifying Characteristics of La Cosa Nostra

The typical LCN crime family is not rigidly organized. Members, whether "soldiers" or "capos," can go into and manage their own legitimate businesses; and what they earn in this manner belongs to them and not to the mob. Moreover, at the death of such individuals, the business can be inherited by their children without the syndicate sharing in the estate. However, the syndicate does get its "take" in whatever illegitimate activities the individual is involved, as well as from some of his legitimate businesses if they have been financed by the crime family; and at his death the syndicate decides whether the operation passes on to a blood relative or to another crime family member. In many cases, moreover, the syndicate has provided the bankroll that allowed the member to set up his illegal operations.

The typical LCN family avoids bookkeeping in its operations, relying instead on the use of people it can trust. The penalty for cheating is death and it is carried out ruthlessly, without appeal.

Because of the huge amounts of cash generated by their illegal operations, the syndicate uses "front" or "straw" men whom they can set up in legitimate businesses.


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Profits from these operations are "skimmed" by the syndicate and the business itself always remains effectively under the syndicate's control. This is done by having one of their own people work within the operation, perhaps as a manager, secretary or treasurer. Although the straw man may have no criminal record and no previous organized crime connections, the presence of a known organized crime member in his organization should send an immediate signal to law enforcement agencies.

Disputes between crime families can lead to gang warfare, but the more frequent solution is to go to arbitration through a "sitdown"* or a commission set up by the families for that purpose. A crime family moving into a new territory frequently will seek permission to operate from the crime family or families dominant in the area, even though the operation is not of the same nature as those in which the resident crime families are involved. Normally, they would not seek permission if their activity were going to conflict with operations controlled by the resident crime family or families. Territorial rights are basic to LCN family activities, and unless these rights are addressed gang warfare is a likely consequence.

Since the basis of the syndicate's power is its illicit operations, and since it can have no recourse to the legal system of society when differences arise, a very high premium is put on respect for the property rights system. This same system not only applies to the activities of the families but to the individual members within the families.

Examining the solid waste hauling industry, one finds that the property rights system is rigidly enforced. Rebel carters, who will not abide by the system, face intimidation, violence and, as a last resort, murder.

The strategy by which the LCN compels compliance with the property rights system includes the following:

  1. It develops and obtains control of waste trade associations, the membership of which is made up of the waste haulers operating in the area. Through the association it is able to dictate the price that the haulers will receive for their services. And it uses the property rights principle to prevent the customers from switching to another hauler to obtain better terms. The haulers are assured of a given territory in which to operate and are able to obtain higher prices for their services through bid-rigging. There is, of course, a kickback to the syndicate.
  2. It also develops and/or infiltrates the union that supplies the haulers with their workers. Through the union it can exercise control over the customers and the haulers through the ability to call strikes. Waste hauling is an industry particularly vulnerable to strikes. An uncooperative supermarket chain, for example, can be brought to its knees very quickly if the union refuses to pick up its trash. Similarly, a hauler who violates the property rights system or balks at the payoff that goes to the syndicate will find that his own union workers are suddenly striking against him; or the syndicate has authorized another carting company to cut into his territory at lower rates, possibly only because the other carter has a sweetheart deal that allows him to pay less than union wages, despite the fact that he employs union workers.





  3. It seeks to corrupt law enforcement officers and public officials with bribes, payoffs and even intimidation. Mob money and mob influence has played a role in the elections of public officials, has even been said to have played a role in the election of a president. In World War II mob assistance was sought and obtained in assuring a successful beachhead in Sicily. In New York State, when Anthony Scotto, subsequently convicted for racketeering, was on trial, Governor Hugh Carey, three now ex-mayors of New York--"Abe" Beame, Robert Wagner and John Lindsay--as well as labor leader Lane Kirkland, were among those appearing as character witnesses for him.
  4. It is prepared to use economic reprisal, threats, violence and even murder to achieve its ends. In recent years it has had to resort to violence less frequently than in the past, but this is only because its reputation for wanton cruelty has become so widely known that the mere knowledge that the mob is behind a particular enterprise is sufficient to terrorize the average businessman or private citizen into compliance.

Such, in broadest outline, is the profile of organized crime's methods of operation. The case histories that follow cannot in every instance cite conclusive proof of organized crime's .involvement, but if the profile offered here is used as a benchmark, it should provide highly reliable insights into which operations are, indeed, apparently connected with organized crime.

Suggested Background Materials

The Mafia or LCN has now entered the folklore of our culture. Any six-year-old who watches TV has some familiarity with the way the mob operates. Inevitably, the public's conception of criminal activities suffers from oversimplification, as, indeed, do some of the statements made by law enforcement officials.

The outline of the Structure of Racketeering in the Solid and Hazardous Waste Hauling Industry presented above has been based on several outside sources, as well as this committee's own investigations.

The investigation of improper activities in the labor or management field, which resulted in hearings before the select committee under the chairmanship of U.S. Senator John McClellan in 1957, provided insight into the racketeering that was taking place in the solid waste hauling industry in the United States. These hearings are of particular importance in understanding the situation in New York City, Long Island and the Westchester area. What makes them even more remarkable is that today, 30 years later, the crime families and some of the same individuals named at those hearings, and their progeny, are still in operation.

It was, of course, Joseph Valachi's testimony before a United States Senate committee in 1963 that revealed for the first time the broad organizational structure and nationwide membership of the LCN.

The Presidents Commission on Organized Crime, which has been holding hearings since 1984 and just released its final report in March 1986, has also provided important information on organized crime activities at the present time.


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In between there have been several important hearings by the New York and New Jersey state legislatures that have focused specifically on the solid and hazardous waste hauling industries.

For those who are interested in further information on the matters referred to in connection with the LCN's ability to corrupt and intimidate political figures, the section on Nick Rattenni and the City of Yonkers provides some local examples. The section dealing with John Fine's investigations and the Ramapo landfill is also illustrative. Charles "Lucky" Luciano's participation in World War II on two occasions--once to end sabotage on New York's docks, and later to ease an allied landing at Palermo, Sicily--have been mentioned before in the media. Similarly, with regard to the mob's assistance in securing the Chicago vote for John F. Kennedy in the presidential election as well as the allegations of their involvement in his assassination. Nor should the plot to murder Fidel Castro, through mob agents, be forgotten. Closer to home, the corruption of political figures in .Long Island, both Democratic and Republican, is discussed in Sections Ten and Eleven. In one instance, a state legislator, brother of a U.S. senator, does not come out untainted.


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HAROLD KAUFMAN:
PORTRAIT OF AN INFORMER

It is safe to say that Harold Kaufman has probably been one of the most productive and reliable witnesses law enforcement agencies have ever had in tracing the influence of organized crime in the solid and hazardous waste hauling industry.

Harold Kaufman was, by way of analogy, like the stub of a Christmas tree. I had the boughs. I had the tinsel. And I had the tree balls. But I could not hang the tree because I did not have the unifying element, and Kaufman was the person inside the trade association that could . . . in effect, pull the whole thing together for me. 5

--Steven Madonna, Deputy Attorney General,
Chief of Environmental Prosecution,
New Jersey Attorney Generals Office

Harold Kaufman, describing his activities:

In 1972 I became an administrative assistant to the president of the Sanitation Union, Local 813, the International Brother- hood of Teamsters in New York City, which is the union that represents the private sanitation industry in the five boroughs, Westchester, Nassau and Suffolk counties. . . . I became an informant for the FBI in 1978. . . . My job was to continue in the garbage industry, to tape grievance meetings, and to inform them of all the possible organized crime involvement in the waste industry. . . . The solid waste industry is completely controlled by the five families of New York City, and upstate is controlled by Joey Pagano. Dutchess County Santitation was a company that was owned by the Fiorillo brothers, Mattie 'The Horse' lanniello, and Ben Cohen. The Mongellis control the lower part of the counties, around Monroe, Sullivan and Ulster, all the way to Port Jervis. . . . As for toxic wastes, I can't say that all toxic wastes are controlled by organized crime, but through conglomerates, SCA, Browning and Ferris Industries, organized crime figures, who through their connec- tions in the solid waste industry, have moved strongly into it. 6


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Document formatted for web in 2006 by
Thomas Hunt
P.O. Box 1350
New Milford, CT
06776-1350